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SHIPTON V. BARFIELD: DUTIES OF SUBDIVISION
DEVELOPERS TO LOT PURCHASERS
Common law rules such as the doctrine of caveat emptor and the
strictures of the Statute of Frauds have traditionally governed the
relationship between real estate vendors and purchasers. Many
courts adhere to the strict common law precedents, but some recent
limitations of the old doctrines indicate a desirable trend toward a
more purchaser-protective attitude by the courts.' This development,
however, has been neither rapid nor universal. As a result,-many real
estate subdivision purchasers have been frustrated by unenforceable-,
promises and unfulfilled expectations.
Judicial reluctance to recognize the developments protecting real
estate purchasers was manifested in the North Carolina case of
Shipton v. Barfield.' In that case, homeowners sought, damages
against the developer of the subdivision in which their property was
located for refusing to seek reformation of a mistake in one restrictive
covenant and for failing to enforce another restriction contained in
the deed to an adjoining lot.3 Deeds from the developer, the Star-
mount Company, to purchasers in the "Friendly Acres" subdivision
routinely contained a covenant that no building would be constructed
within 125 feet of the property line on the street abutting the front of
a lot.' Starmount used form deeds in conveying the lots, completing
the building setback restricion by typing "125" into a blank space in
the applicable covenants. However, the blank in the deed to the lot
adjoining the plaintiffs', owned by the co-defendants Barfield, was
nonsensically completed with the word "their" rather than a num-
ber. 5 That lot remained unimproved for decades while homes were
constructed on neighboring properties in conformance with the 125-
foot building line. In 1972 the Barfields commenced construction of
a residence fifty feet from the front property line of their lot. The
See text accompanying notes 41-58 infra.
23 N.C. App. 58, 208 S.E.2d 210, cert. denied, 286 N.C. 212, 209 S.E.2d 316
(1974).
The plaintiffs also sued the adjoining landowners, but this issue was not consid-
ered by the court in this decision.
I Brief for Appellant at 5, Shipton v. Barfield, 23 N.C. App. 58, 208 S.E.2d 210
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant].
5 The co-defendants Barfield derived title to their lot through mesne conveyances
from the developer. The setback restrictions in this deed to the Barfields' predecessor
in title reads: "No building shall be erected or allowed to remain on said property
within their feet of the property line on the street or road abutting the front of said
property. . . ." 23 N.C. App. at 59, 208 S.E.2d at 212 (emphasis added).
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plaintiffs notified Starmount of the apparent mistake in the covenant
in the Barfields' chain of title, but the developer refused to reform
the error.'
The plaintiffs also sought damages for the developer's failure to
enforce a building plan approval covenant. One of Starmount's re-
strictions on the Barfields' lot prohibited construction until the plans
for the proposed structure had been submitted to and approved by
the developer. Starmount did not demand submission of the Bar-
fields' plans before construction began, and thereafter approved them
even though both the appearance and the location of the structure did
not conform to the common neighborhood scheme. 7 The plaintiffs
claimed damages of $12,000 to the value of their property as a result
of the non-conformity of the Barfield house to the general subdivision
plan.' The trial court granted Starmount's motion to dismiss for fail-
ure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.' Affirming
the dismissal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals found neither
factual nor legal bases for imposing a duty to the plaintiffs on the
Starmount Company. 10
The appellate court, relying on Hege v. Sellers," held that only
the parties to a deed, or those claiming under them in "privity," have
standing to maintain an action for reformation."2 In Hege, subdivision
homeowners had sought reformation of a deed from the developer to
another lot purchaser to include a restriction found in the deeds to
all other lots in the subdivision. The plaintiffs alleged that the restric-
tion had been omitted from the purchaser's deed by mutal mistake
of the parties. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the
plaintiffs lacked standing because they were not in "privity"'3 with
the original parties to the deed. Thus, the Hege rule requires plain-
tiffs seeking reformation of a deed to be in the chain of title.'4
Brief for Appellant, supra note 4, at 5-6.
23 N.C. App. at 60, 208 S.E.2d at 212. The Barfields' residence was constructed
50 feet from the front property line, and the lot failed to meet the minimum width
restriction contained in the deed. Id.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 4, at 6.
23 N.C. App. at 61, 208 S.E.2d at 212. The defendant's motion was pursuant to
North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
23 N.C. App. at 61-63, 208 S.E.2d at 212-14.
241 N.C. 240, 84 S.E.2d 892 (1954).
12 23 N.C. App. at 61, 208 S.E.2d at 213.
" 241 N.C. at 246, 84 S.E.2d at 897. The court relied on Sills v. Ford, 171 N.C.
733, 88 S.E. 636 (1916), which held that only a party with a mutual or successive
interest in the same rights of property as the original party is in privity of estate.
" 241 N.C. at 246, 84 S.E.2d at 897. To be in the "chain of title," the plaintiffs
must trace their ownership back to the deed in question. The property of the plaintiffs
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The Shipton court, by relying on Hege, failed to distinguish an
action seeking reformation from a suit for damages based on the
developer's refusal to reform. At issue in Shipton was not whether the
plaintiffs had standing to seek reformation15 but rather whether Star-
mount was liable for damages for failing to reform the erroneous deed.
Thus, the Hege precedent concerning standing in an action for refor-
mation is arguably inapposite.
In disposing of the plaintiffs' second claim, the Shipton court
considered the developer's responsibility for enforcing restrictive cov-
enants. The plaintiffs had contended that Starmount breached its
obligation by failing to demand submission of the Barfields' plans
before construction began and by subsequently approving the pro-
posed house even though it was in violation of certain restrictions in
the deed. 6 However, the court held that a duty to enforce could arise
only by a further covenant, express or implied, between the developer
and the plaintiff. Generalizing that restrictive covenants are not fa-
vored by the law and finding no basis for a covenant to enforce in the
language of the deed, or in the "presumed intention of the parties,"17
the court held that the deyeloper was hot obligated to enforce the
common scheme of restrictions.' The court found rather that the
plan approval restriction "appears to be . . . intended for the sole
benefit of the defendant Starmount Company." 9
However, the plaintiffs alleged that both of the covenants in ques-
tion were at least partly for their benefit. The final paragraph of
restrictions in the Starmount deed to the Barfields' predecessor in
title provided that the setback restriction could be waived only with
the consent of the adjoining property owners. This waiver provided
the basis for the plaintiffs' argument that they were third party bene-
ficiaries of the covenant," and decisions from other jurisdictions sup-
port their contention. 1 As third party beneficiaries, the plaintiffs
should have been entitled to protect their interests2 from deprivation
must have been conveyed by the deed sought to be reformed. For a discussion of privity
of estate, see C. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RuN WITH
LAND" 111-15 (2d ed. 1947).
,1 The plaintiffs' claims were limited to damages. Brief for Appellant, supra note
4, at 2.
" 23 N.C. App. at 60, 208 S.E.2d at 212.
' Id. at 62, 208 S.E.2d at 213.
"Id. at 62-63, 208 S.E.2d at 213-14.
"Id. at 63, 208 S.E.2d at 214.
" Brief for Appellant, supra note 4, at 13-14. See Lamica v. Gerdes, 270 N.C. 85,
153 S.E.2d 814, 818 (1967).
21 See, e.g., Minner v. City of Lynchburg, 204 Va. 180, 129 S.E.2d 673 (1963).
22 Cf. Bristol v. Woodward, 251 N.Y. 275, 167 N.E. 441 (1929)
1975]
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resulting from the developer's mistake and subsequent refusal to cor-
rect the error. Nevertheless, the court stated that the law of third
party beneficiaries as it relates to restrictive covenants provides a
remedy only among subdivision lot purchasers. The court did not
address the problem faced by a lot owner who cannot enforce an
intended covenant because of an error of the subdivider.3
The plan approval covenant, like the setback restriction, was
partly for the benefit of the plaintiffs. The final paragraph of cove-
nants in the deeds to the "Friendly Acres" lots provided that upon
dissolution of the Starmount Company the right to approve or disap-
prove proposed building plans would pass to a committee of property
owners in the subdivision. 4 Thus, if Starmount had been dissolved
and the committee of property owners had been appointed, the com-
mittee would have enjoyed the right reserved by Starmount to de-
mand submission of the Barfields' plans for approval before construc-
tion could begin. By granting the property owners the right to decide
the suitability of proposed building plans, Starmount ensured that
the restriction would not become inoperative for want of a party with
standing to enforce the covenant. Had the approval restriction ex-
isted solely for the benefit of Starmount, such a provision would have
been unnecessary.
The choice of the property owners as the group to whom this right
to approve should pass demonstrates that the developer recognized
the substantial interest of the lot owners in maintaining the integrity
of the subdivision plan. Such plan approval covenants are at least
partly intended to preserve the characteristics of the subdivision,
resulting from the scheme of restrictions, which induce purchasers to
buy lots in the development. So long as the developer has lots to sell,
it has a substantial interest in seeing that the appealing qualities of
the subdivision are preserved. If the neighborhood is attractive, the
2 North Carolina case law indicates that the plaintiffs would probably be unable
to enforce the setback restriction against the Barfields. See Craven County v. First-
Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 237 N.C. 502, 75 S.E.2d 620 (1953). The only such restric-
tion in their chain of title was the highly ambiguous covenant set out in note 5 supra.
A court considering the covenant would construe against restriction of the grantee's
land, Long v. Branham, 271 N.C. 264, 156 S.E.2d 235 (1967), so the lot would probably
be found unencumbered. Furthermore, the setback requirement would not be implied
from the uniformity of the other restrictions, unless the developer expressly covenanted
in another deed to a "Friendly Acres" lot that all the property was bound by the
setback line. See Reed v. Elmore, 246 N.C. 221, 98 S.E.2d 360 (1957); St. Luke's
Episcopal Church v. Berry, 2 N.C. App. 617, 163 S.E.2d 664 (1968). It does not appear
that any such express limitation was made by Starmount.
24 Brief for Appellant, supra note 4, at 12.
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developer will be able to sell lots more easily and at an enhanced
price. After the developer has profited from the sale of all of its lots,
the subdivision lot purchasers assume the greatest interest in ensur-
ing that the neighborhood remains an attractive place to live.25 Thus,
lot owners and the developer have a mutual interest in preserving
property values which the developer should not be permitted to disre-
gard by arbitrarily approving building plans.
The plaintiffs in Shipton argued that Starmount had acted
unreasonably by approving plans for a house which failed to conform
to the common neighborhood restrictions." The plan approval cove-
nant did not specify what criteria Starmount should apply in decid-
ing upon plans submitted by lot purchasers, but most courts have
enforced such covenants, finding they are not void for lack of specific
standards.Y In determining the acceptability of proposed plans, these
courts have held that the party empowered to consider the plans must
not act arbitrarily, unreasonably or in bad faith.2 The issue of
25 Authority exists for the proposition that once a developer has sold all the subdi-
vision lots and is no longer beneficially interested in the scheme of restrictions it will
not be allowed to enforce the covenants. See Kent v. Koch, 166 Cal. App. 2d 579, 333
P.2d 411 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Stegall v. Housing Authority, 278 N.C. 95, 178 S.E.2d
824 (1971); London County Council v. Allen, [1914] 3 K.B. 642. But see Van Sant v.
Rose, 260 Ill. 401, 103 N.E. 194 (1913). The decisions, in holding the covenants unen-
forceable by the grantor, treat restrictive covenants as "equitable easements" and
apply the rule invalidating negative easements in gross. Application of this rule to a
case in which the developer had sold all subdivision lots restricted by a plan approval
covenant such as that of "Friendly Acres" will produce incongruous results. Assuming
the developer no longer owns land benefited by the restriction, it will not be allowed
to enforce the approval covenant. Furthermore, the right to approve the plans would
pass to the subdivision lot owners, who do possess benefited land, only upon dissolution
of the development company. Therefore, the plan approval covenant would be unen-
forceable in the interim between the sale of the last lot by the developer and the
company's dissolution.
28 Brief for Appellant, supra note 4, at 2.
2 See, e.g., Rhue v. Cheyenne Homes, Inc., 168 Colo. 6, 449 P.2d 361 (1969);
Carroll County Dev. Corp. v. Buckworth, 234 Md. 547, 200 A.2d 145 (1964). The only
jurisdiction which has refused to enforce plan approval covenants lacking specific
standards on the grounds of vagueness is Ohio. Courts in that state have required only
compliance with restrictions of record. Carranor Woods Property Owners' Ass'n v.
Driscoll, 106 Ohio App. 95, 6 Ohio Op. 2d 361, 153 N.E.2d 681 (Ct. App. 1957). The
plaintiffs in Shipton argued that the developer failed to require conformity with a
restriction of record by approving the Barfields' plans. A covenant in the Barfields'
chain of title prohibited construction of lots less than 75 feet wide, a requirement which
their lot did not meet.
1 Bramwell v. Kuhle, 183 Cal. App. 2d 767, 6 Cal. Rptr. 839 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
In Bramwell the subdivider sold all subdivision lots, and appointed a committee to
accept or reject proposed plans. The committee disapproved a building proposal but
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.whether the power to decide on the suitability of a proposed structure
has been exercised properly is a question of fact.u Generally, it should
be determined whether the proposed structure is in conformity with
the overall scheme of the subdivision, is in harmony with adjoining
buildings, and is in compliance with the specific restrictions set out
in the subdivision plan."
Because Starmount's plan approval covenant was partially for the
benefit of the plaintiffs while its approval of the Barfields' noncon-
forming plans was arguably arbitrary, the plaintiffs' claim was via-
ble. The acts and omissions of the developer substantially affected
the plaintiffs' property value and provided the plaintiffs with a claim
which was not "clearly without merit," as the Shipton~court held.'
The plight of the plaintiffs in Shipton typifies that of purchasers
who are induced by the restricted development of a subdivision to
buy lots with the expectation that mutual restrictions will protect the
value of their property.2 Many courts have recognized that such pur-
chasers are persuaded to acquire land by the creation of a scheme of
subdivision restrictions and by assurances that restrictive covenants
will prevent undesirable uses of neighboring lots.33 The issues raised
by the purchasers unfulfilled expectations that their property values
will be protected by a properly designed and implemented plan of
uniform restrictions have been difficult to resolve.
Purchasers often acquire property in reliance on a developer's oral
assurances that the subdivision lots are subject to uniform restric-
tions, learning subsequently that ' such promises may be unenforce-
able. 4 As one North Carolina Court of Appeals judge has observed:
[It does not seem equitable for [a developer] to lead [lot
owners] into purchasing these lots upon the promise of a re-
stricted residential subdevelopment (and more than likely at
inflated prices because of the restrictive covenants); then later
the developer, with knowledge of the objections of neighboring landowners and without
investigating the situation, attempted to approve the plans. The court determined that
under the circumstances, because the plans were not in keeping with the common
neighborhood restrictions, the developer's approval was arbitrary and ineffective. The
court enjoined the proposed construction.
21 La Vielle v. Seay, 412 S.W.2d 587, 593 (Ky. 1966).
n Id.
3, 23 N.C. App. at 63, 208 S.E.2d at 214.
" Brief for Appellant, supra note 4, at 7.
33 See, e.g., Hunt v. Del Collo, - Del. Ch. -, 317 A.2d 545 (Ch. 1974); Higdon
v. Jaffa, 231 N.C. 242, 56 S.E.2d 661 (1949).
34 See, e.g., St. Luke's Episcopal Church v. Berry, 2 N.C. App. 617, 163 S.E.2d
664 (1968).
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convey lots . . . without including the covenants in the
deed[s] . . ..
However, in those jurisdictions which analogize equitable restrictions
to negative easements,36 a restrictive covenant is deemed an interest
in land and may be subject to the Statute of Frauds and therefore-
cannot be proven by parol evidence." Although a developer's oral
assurances do not impose restrictive covenants on the land, they
should bind the developer himself, thereby entitling purchasers to
damages for breach of promise. An oral contract binding only a devel-
oper personally is not subject to the real estate Statute of Frauds,"
and verbal promises to include restrictions in subsequent convey-
ances have been enforced against grantors by several courts.3
The issue of the enforceability of oral representations often arises
in subdivision cases as a result of a developer's promise to a purchaser
that all development lots are uniformly restricted. In some cases
when purchasers have relied on these assurances, whether made by
oral representations or by display of a subdivision plat indicating a
general scheme of restrictions, developers have been required to fulfill
their promises. For example, in the Texas case of Burgess v.
Putnam,"5 a developer was enjoined from conveying subdivision lots
by deeds without including restrictions identical to those imposed on
lots previously purchased by the plaintiffs. When the plaintiffs had
bought their property, the developers' plan for the subdivision pro-
hibited use of the land for mobile home sites. A subsequent change
in the real estate market afforded the developers an opportunity to
11 Id. at 625, 163 S.E.2d at 669-70 (Brock, J., dissenting).
"See, e.g., Davis v. Robinson, 189 N.C. 589, 127 S.E. 697 (1925); 3 H. TInFNY,
THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 860 (3d ed. 1939) [hereinafter cited as TIFFANY] and
cases cited at note 57 therein.
" 3 TIFFANY, supra note 36, § 860. Professor Tiffany further suggests that the
Statute of Frauds is applicable to equitable restrictions even where they are'treated
as contracts, rather than as negative easements. He argues that a contract unlimited
in duration and controlling the use of land cannot be considered as being capable of
performance in one year, and is therefore ineffectual under the Statute of Frauds. Id.
If it is conceded that equitable restrictions are subject to the Statute of Frauds, Tiffany
argues that the three exceptions of part performance, fraud and estoppel are inapplica-
ble to a grantor's oral representations. Id. But see Cato v. English, 228 Ga. 120, 184
S.E.2d 161 (1971); Groot, Annual Survey of Georgia Law-Real Property, 24 MERCER
L. REv. 309, 342-43 (1973); Reno, The Enforcement of Equitable Servitudes in Land:
Part II, 28 VA. L. Rzv. 1067, 1093-95 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Reno].
uSee 3 S. WILLISTON, LAW OF CoNTRACTs § 439A (3d ed. Jaeger 1960).
31 E.g., Thornton v. Schobe, 79 Colo. 25, 243 P. 617 (1925); Bristol v. Woodward,
251 N.Y. 275, 167 N.E. 441 (1929).
1* 464 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
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realize a ready profit by selling their remaining lots for mobile home
use. The homeowners sued to enjoin such sales.
The developers in Burgess had made no written promise to restrict
uniformly all lots in the subdivision. Restrictions were not recorded
with the subdivision plat, but rather were included separately in each
deed from the developers to lot purchasers. Furthermore, each deed
contained a merger clause to the effect that all representations and
covenants affecting the lot were expressed in the written agreement,
and that no others should be recognized.' The court found that the
representations of the developers that no incompatible uses of other
lots would be permitted were material in inducing the plaintiffs to
purchase restricted lots at an enhanced price. Such material misre-
presentations, even in the absence of fraud,42 established the plaintiff
lot owners' "equitable right to compel the [developers] to restrict
similarly the use of any remaining subdivision property as a protec-
tion of plaintiffs' investment and of the lots they had purchased."43
The court further held that the importance of protecting purchasers
from material misrepresentations of vendors outweighed the advan-
tages of contractual certainty and that the admissibility of parol
evidence to prove the misrepresentations of the developer, in spite of
the merger clause, was proper."
In a similar case, Westhampton, Inc. v. Kehoe,45 the Supreme
Court of Georgia found that a developer was bound by its parol repre-
sentations. The developer in Westhampton owned a large tract of
land which was platted into four sections. The first three sections
were developed with identical minimum residence cost and size re-
strictions imposed upon each lot. Further, the plaintiffs were shown
an unrecorded plat indicating that these same restrictions would be
impressed upon the fourth section of the subdivision. The court held
that the oral promises of the developer, the uniformity of the develop-
ment scheme of the first three sections of the subdivision and the
restrictions in the plaintiffs deed supplied sufficient evidence of an
implied reciprocal servitude" to support an interlocutory injunction
, Id. at 700-01.
42 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 476(1) and comment (b) at 909 (1932).
464 S.W.2d at 700.
, Id. at 700-01.
'5 227 Ga. 642, 182 S.E.2d 430 (1971).
" The doctrine of implied reciprocal negative servitudes was restated by the Su-
preme Court of Michigan:
If the owner of two or more lots, so situated as to bear the relation,
sells one with restrictions of benefit to the land retained, the servitude
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against the sale of lots without the same minimum cost and size
covenants.47
Other courts have similarly indicated that developers may not
abandon a general restriction plan to the detrimaent of those who
purchased lots in reliance on the uniformity of restrictions48 without
express reservation, in deeds to purchasers, of the right to alter the
scheme. 9 The introduction of mass production and sales techniques
into the field of real estate has resulted in a slow but steady erosion"
of the doctrine of caveat emptor,5 ' which has governed realty transac-
tions for centuries.5 Several courts recently considering the applica-
becomes mutual, and, during the period of restraint, the owner of the
lot or lots retained can do nothing forbidden to the owner of the lot
sold.
Sanborn v. McLean, 233 Mich. 227, 229-30, 206 N.W. 496, 497 (1925). This doctrine
furnishes a basis for enforcement of a general scheme of restrictions against land
retained by a developer in those jurisdictions which do not enforce oral agreements to
impose restrictive covenants upon land. See Reno, supra note 37, at 1092. Several cases
have held that an implied restrictive covenant on remaining subdivision lots arises
when a developer promises a lot purchaser that unsold property will be subject to
similar restrictions. See, e.g., Sanborn v. McLean, supra; Spicer v. Martin, 14 App.
Cas. 12 (1888). The express restrictions in the lot purchasers' deeds, coupled with the
developer's promise of similar restrictions upon all lots subsequently sold, provided the
implied covenant in these cases. No problems with the Statute of Frauds were per-
ceived by these courts. A reciprocal covenant, the terms of which were embodied in
the plaintiff's deed poll signed by the developer, not an oral agreement, was being
enforced. Such an analysis obviates the need for a suit against the developer to main-
tain the uniformity of the subdivision scheme by imposing the restrictions on the
property in the development. See Reno, supra note 37, at 1092-93.
'T 227 Ga. at 646, 182 S.E.2d at 434.
" Williams v. Cone, 249 S.C. 374, 154 S.E.2d 682 (1967) (dictum).
' Bave v. Guenveur, 36 Del. Ch. 48, 125 A.2d 256 (Ch. 1956).
This trend eroding caveat emptor has included the recognition of a warranty of
habitability in leases, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); a warranty of quality by builder-vendors of new
homes, e.g., Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); and the
regulation of subdivision land sales, see, e.g., Coffey & Welch, Federal Regulation of
Land Sales: Full Disclosures Comes Down to Earth, 21 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 5 (1969).
51 See generally Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133
(1931).
52 Caveat emptor has been part of the common law for centuries:
Note, that by the civill law every man is bound to warrant the thing
that he selleth or conveyeth, albeit there be no expresse warranty; but
the common law bindeth him not, unlesse there be a warranty, either
in deed or in law; for caveat emptor . ...
2 COKE, LrrrIgroN 102(a), c.7, § 145 (17th ed. 1817). Thus, in Louisiana there is no
doctrine of caveat emptor in the law of sales or personalty or realty. LA. Civ. CODE ANN.
art. 2520 (West. 1952).
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tion of caveat emptor to the sale of new houses have limited the
doctrine. 53 Home buyers, with increasing frequency, have prevailed
against builder-vendors on claims for faulty construction on the theo-
ries of implied warranty, express warranty, warranty of marketable
title, fraud and negligence. 4 Furthermore, legislation regulating sub-
division sales has been enacted on both national and state levels to
protect purchasers from unfair real estate sales practices. 5
Although caveat emptor still predominates in real estate law," the
need for protection of land purchasers has created a desriable trend
away from the doctrine. The enforcement of developers' promises to
restrict subdivision lots in accordance with a general neighborhood
plan of covenants is equitable. The recognition of similar duties to
enforce covenants which will preserve the neighborhood plan and
benefit subdivision lot owners, and to draft, transcribe and record
properly the common restrictions so that they will be enforceable, is
equally reasonable. This "warranty of quality" will fulfill purchasers'
expectations that the significant protections provided consumers of
personal property 7 apply to transactions as important as subdivision
property sales. 8 The protections afforded subdivision lot purchasers
should not be limited to the old common law doctrines of reciprocal
5 See, e.g., Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); Miller
v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd., [1931] 2 K.B. 113. See Bearman, Caveat Emptor In
Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REV. 541 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Bearman]; Note, The Doctrine of Caveat Emptor As Applied To
Both The Leasing And Sale of Real Property: The Need For Reappraisal And Reform,
2 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 120 (1970).
" See generally Bearman, supra note 53; Haskell, The Case for an Implied War-
ranty of Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53 GEO. L.J. 633, 638-48 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as Haskell]; Note, Commerical Law-Implied Warranties in Sales of Real Es-
tate-The Trend to Abolish Caveat Emptor, 22 DE PAUL L.J. 510, 516-21 (1972); Note,
S.275-The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 714, 717-19
(1967).
11 The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1970),
requires a developer which uses the mails or interstate communications in land sales
to provide potential purchasers and the Securities and Exchange Commission with
information concerning both the property and the developer itself. Failure to comply
with the requirements of the Act may permit purchasers to rescind the transaction or
to collect damages. The states have also moved to protect consumers in subdivision
transactions by enacting disclosure laws similar to the federal act. See, e.g., GA. CODE
ANN. 4§ 84-6101 et seq. (Supp. 1974); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 45:15-:16.1 (Supp. 1974)g
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 337-339(c) (McKinney 1968).
56 Haskell, supra note 54, at 655.
51 The implied warranties applicable to sales of goods are contained in UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314, 2-315.
" See Bearman, supra note 53.
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negative easements,59 fraud," the strained warranty liability of new
home builders and the disclosure requirements. Purchasers should be
allowed the protection of an implied warranty of quality of the subdi-
vision land which they purchase,' for the unenforceability of a re-
strictive covenant can cause as much economic damage to a lot pur-
chaser as a construction defect does to a homeowner. In either event,
the purchaser is harmed because the vendor failed to exercise care in
developing the subdivision. Purchasers could be protected ade-
quately if a warranty of quality analogous to those found in the Uni-
form Commercial Code"2 were applied to sales of real estate.
The warranty of quality implied in subdivision lot sales would
assure the purchaser that the property and protective restrictions
bought are fit for the residential purposes for which they are in-
tended, and that the purchaser will not be deprived of the value of
his land as a result of the misfeasance or nonfeasance of the vendor.
While a purchaser may expect a developer, especially a commercial
realtor or subdivider, to possess the competence to devise a subdivi-
sion scheme which will be effective, the lot owner in a residential
subdivision is primarily interested in maintaining the neighborhood
as an enjoyable place to live, and in preserving the value of his prop-
erty.
Developers uniformly restrict subdivision land to procure the
highest possible price for individual lots. Purchasers pay enhanced
prices because they expect restricted subdivisions to be orderly and
high quality. While an implied warranty should not be construed as
an absolute guarantee that lot purchasers will always receive all that
they expect, it should ensure purchasers that they will not be denied
their reasonable expectations.
1' This doctrine is not accepted in several states. See 3 TIFFANY, supra note 36, §
860.
o A potential plaintiff may experience substantial difficulty in proving the scien-
ter necessary to make a prima facie case of misrepresentation, particularly if the
plaintiff's case is based on a mistake of the developer which renders a covenant unen-
forceable, as in Shipton. For the elements of a prima facie case of fraud, see 12 S.
WILLTSTON LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1487 (3d ed. Jaeger 1970).
11 Haskell, supra note 54, at 648-55.
62 The implied warranties of §§ 2-314 and 2-315 of the Uniform Commercial Code
require that goods be reasonably fit for the purpose for which they are sold. Moreover,
if the seller has reason to know of a particular purpose for which the buyer intends to
use the goods and the buyer relies on the seller's skill and judgment, the warranty
extends to that specific use. The developer of a subdivision would have reason to know
that lot purchasers planned to use their property as restricted high quality homesites,
and the purchasers in turn may rely on the developer's judgment in devising an effec-
tive and enforceable scheme of restrictions to protect their lots.
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The burden of ascertaining that the restriction of the subdivision
lots have been properly implemented should fall on the developers
rather than on each individual purchaser. Developers enjoy substan-
tial flexibility in planning subdivisions. They are in a position to
employ knowledgeable legal counsel and expert planners in develop-
ing their land to insure that the subdivision scheme is both effective
and enforceable. Further, subdividers can allocate the cost of such
expert advice to each purchaser by including the consultants' fees in
the cost of the development and by apportioning the charge among
the lots. 3
The developer formulates the restrictions applicable to a subdivi-
sion and can either make all covenants enforceable by lot purchasers,
or retain certain enforcement rights. If a developer wishes to retain
the power to enforce the common restrictions which benefit all lot
owners, it may do so. However, the developer should not be allowed
to deprive lot owners of the benefit of the restrictions and adversely
affect their property values by retaining exclusive power to enforce
covenants, and then failing to enforce them. The warranty of quality
should not only require that the covenants be diligently transcribed,
but should also protect the lot owners in their particular uses of the
land, either by providing purchasers with the right to enforce or by
assuring the lot owners that the developer will protect-their interests.
The warranty of quality will not deprive developers of the power
to utilize their land as they wish. It will, however, require an express
disclaimer of warranty 4 if the developer intends to reserve the right
to alter the common scheme of restrictions and the character of the
subdivision. The developer need only plan in advance and inform
potential purchasers of the disclaimer, and the purchasers will be on
notice that they may not rely on the uniformity of the subdivision
plan. If buyers, such as the plaintiffs in Shipton, are forewarned, they
will not be misled by appearances or expectations and can bargain
accordingly.
FRANcIs CHARLES CLARK
A developer's warranty that all restrictive covenants have been completed cor-
rectly may also aid in limiting the necessary extent of title searches. If each lot pur-
chaser bears the risk of erroneous covenants in deeds to other lots, an extensive title
search requiring the reading of all covenants in all subdivision deeds will be necessary
for the buyer's protection of his property. In large subdivisions such deed examination
could be very expensive and time consuming.
11 See the disclaimer provisions in § 2-316 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Under a "warranty of quality" the developer would not be required to impose uniform
restrictions or enforce all covenants for the benefit of its grantees. It would, however,
be obligated to inform subdivision purchasers of its intention not to be bound by the
implied warranty of quality.
